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Existing research on the relationship between nonviolent and violent dissent has focused on 
primary tactics and explicit shifts in organized strategies. This disregards less-organized forms 
of violence such as riots during otherwise nonviolent and peaceful mobilization. Even though 
such disorganized violence is common during mobilization, we know little about how it 
influences the onset and fate of major nonviolent campaigns. Activists often argue that 
nonviolent discipline is essential for effective large-scale mobilization, and that riots and 
disorganized violence will be counterproductive and undermine the emergence or sustenance 
of mass nonviolent campaigns. However, others emphasize how riots often grow through 
diffusion, and see spontaneous disorganized violence as events that could have a mobilizing 
effect on large-scale protest. We detail these competing perspectives on how riots and 
unorganized violence can influence the onset of large-scale nonviolent campaigns and affect 
their likely outcomes. We then evaluate empirically the contending claims by examining how 
riots affect the initial emergence of nonviolent dissident campaigns and the likelihood that 
campaigns will terminate. We find that riots scale with protest size, and thus may appear to 
have short-term mobilizing effects on protest. However, once we take into account the common 
trending, we find that nonviolent mobilization are less likely to emerge after riots, and ongoing 
campaigns are more likely to collapse under higher rates of rioting. 
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Incidental violence and nonviolent protest 
Many of the largest and most impactful challenges to autocratic rulers around the world have 
relied on nonviolent dissident tactics (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011: 5-12). Sharp (2005: 49-
60) notes 198 methods of nonviolent resistance within three broad categories: persuasion (i.e. 
peaceful protests and demonstrations), non-cooperation (i.e. peaceful strikes and boycotts), and 
intervention (i.e. peaceful sit-ins and the overloading of state institutions). Organized 
nonviolent resistance and the nonviolent tactics deployed are conceptually distinct from 
organized violence such as guerrilla warfare or terrorist campaigns. Still, many nonviolent 
campaigns have been accompanied by varying levels of lower level violence, without planning 
or coordination, such as riots or individuals fighting with the police. While the existence of 
rioting is acknowledged in various studies of nonviolent resistance, the lack of research on the 
impact of disorganized violence leaves us without clear answers as to how the presence and 
extent of incidental violence may affect the prospects for and fate of otherwise nonviolent 
campaigns. Does the emergence of rioting help to convey how many are “ticked off”, 
demonstrating the extent of dissatisfaction in ways that helps to promote dissent and sustain 
nonviolent mobilisation? Or does rioting and crowd violence primarily “scare off” potential 
sympathizers, thus undermining the likelihood of a campaign and the sustainability of ongoing 
campaigns by deterring participation and discrediting nonviolent movements?  
Activists and organizers often argue that disorganized violence and riots are unhelpful 
and pose a major challenge for otherwise nonviolent mobilization and the success of campaigns 
(i.e. Popovic and Miller 2015: 195-214) and may undermine momentum by violently escalating 
interactions between dissidents and the state (McAdam, 1982).1  Yet, existing research also 
demonstrates that riots often diffuse and spread, which in turn suggests that they could help 
escalate or mobilize nonviolent dissent (e.g., Aidt et al. 2017).  
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Mozambique between 2008-2012, provides an example that illustrates the apparent 
ambiguous effects of rioting on the prospects of nonviolent mobilization. Mozambique 
witnessed several episodes of volatile popular unrest between 2008 and 2012. At the beginning 
of 2008 the government increased domestic consumer prices to offset increasing import prices, 
and the negative impact on living standards amplified existing grievances and outrage over 
social inequalities and corruption (BBC 2010). Nonviolent protests emerged quickly in the 
capital Maputo and its satellite city Matola, and text messages were used to call for a general 
strike against the price increases. However, the nonviolent protests swiftly descended into 
rioting, where protesters threw stones and set vehicles on fire, eventually unleashing 
government repression. Although the protests initially enjoyed a great deal of support and had 
started to spread to other cities, by February 2008 rioting had effectively shut down Maputo 
and undermined the momentum for nonviolent elements of the dissent. When protests and riots 
emerged again in February 2010 and November 2012, the police were prepared and quicker to 
suppress mobilization (de Brito et al., 2014). Thus, even if riot acts may have helped drawn 
attention to the protest, they also appear to have undermined the ability to mobilize larger 
numbers. 
In contrast, the Otpor! (Resistance!) movement in Serbia (formally still Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia) that toppled Milosević also faced challenges from situations where 
violence could emerge, but were remarkably successful in overcoming these. Otpor! emerged 
in October 1998 to challenge a new law restricting freedom of expression in universities, but 
soon launched a major nonviolent campaign aiming to overthrow the Milosević regime itself. 
Otpor! were met by threats of sanction and heavy-handed repression by the policy and army, 
and there were many opportunities for violent responses to emerge. Yet, Optor! proactively 
strived to avoiding violent responses which they saw as counterproductive, and they were 
remarkably successful in these efforts. Otpor  tried to make repression backfire by using images 
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of beaten protesters to channel outrage into participation in the organized nonviolent 
movement, and created “rapid response teams” to provide legal defence to arrested protesters 
(Kurtz 2010: 5; Sharp 2005: 315-340). At one stage where hardline football hooligans wanted 
to join the protests, Otpor! successfully managed to persuade them to stay away, on the grounds 
that their lack of control and risk of fights with the police could only encourage more repressive 
responses.2 There were only a few large occurrences of disorganized violence, including some 
clashes with police and an arson event in the parliament building in 2000 (Kurtz 2010: 5; 
Pinckney 2006: 49-50). Thus, in sharp contrast to Mozambique, the Otpor! Campaign managed 
to generally contain the risk of disorganized violence and sustain mobilization momentum until 
Milosevic was compelled to resign in September 2000.  
Forms of disorganized violence is a common occurrence alongside many efforts to 
mobilize nonviolent protest campaigns (see e.g., Belgioioso et al. 2019 on Bosnia-
Herzegovina). For the most widely used dataset on large-scale nonviolent campaigns - 
Nonviolent and Violent Campaign and Outcomes (NAVCO) - we find at least one recorded 
riot event in the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD), and for 50% of the campaigns we 
have more than two riot events.3 However, it remains poorly understood how forms of 
disorganized violence such as rioting, impacts the emergence and sustainability of otherwise 
nonviolent dissent. 
Exploring data across Africa, Figure 1 displays the average number of days with protest 
events in a specified location recorded in the SCAD data, binned for each month leading up to 
and after a riot event, during NAVCO/MEC campaigns. This includes both escalatory riots 
coded as emerging directly from initial nonviolent protests, as well as fringe riots deemed to 
simply occur in parallel with nonviolent protests. The dashed horizontal lines indicate that 
average number of events is generally higher in the six months after a riot than in the six months 
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preceding a riot. This at first seems consistent a mobilizing effect of riots on nonviolent dissent. 
However, if there is a growth in protest activity leading up to the riot, then we may simply see 
more riots where we have more nonviolent protest. Since in many instances some extent of 
rioting can be observed during otherwise nonviolent protest and both can increase at the same 
time, the key question is whether there is plausible additional mobilization through riots or 
whether protest could have increased more without riots (or less rioting). This must be assessed 
by comparing to general trends in protest. Moreover, the increase in protest activity after riots 
appears to be relatively short-term and dissipate over the following months. This is in line with 
the idea that riots can ultimately undermine the growth of nonviolent mobilization.  
 




The fact that riots and protest often coexist makes it challenging to evaluate the relative weight 
of the potential positive and negative effects of riots and low-level violence on otherwise 
nonviolent mobilization. While we can explore the variation in the extent of rioting across cases 
of nonviolent mobilization, we cannot directly observe the counterfactual of what mobilization 
would have looked like without such incidents of rioting. We also lack good indicators of 
protest and riot intensity, as existing data rarely record the number of participants. The Social 
Conflict Analysis Data, for example, seeks to record the number of participants in events, but 
this information is missing for around 60% of the observations. Event count measures do not 
accurately reflect participation, as a higher count of small events could entail much lower net 
participation than a single large event (Biggs 2018: 352-353). Moreover, event count measures 
are also sensitive to the identification of individual events within larger campaigns and 
locations. These problems are compounded in many sources such as the SCAD data, as large 
events are often coded as a single nationwide event, whereas smaller confined events are 
counted individually. In this manuscript we focus on evaluating how the extent of observed 
rioting affect otherwise nonviolent protest by focusing on how they influence the likelihood of 
the initial emergence of large-scale nonviolent mobilization as well as their impact on the risk 
that ongoing nonviolent campaigns will collapse. 
The rest of the manuscript is structured as follows. We first review existing research on 
violence in nonviolent campaigns, and how primarily nonviolent campaigns often see extensive 
incidental or unorganized violence. We then turn to the specific mechanisms linking incidental 
violence to campaign emergence and outcomes, detailing the possible negative and positive 
effects of rioting. We examine these propositions using data on riot events before the possible 
outbreak of mass nonviolence and during nonviolent campaigns. Our results suggest that riots 
generally have a detrimental effect on nonviolent mobilization, as we find that nonviolent 
campaigns are less likely to emerge after riots, once we consider the trend in level of protest 
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activity. Moreover, even if riots may appear to increase campaign protest activity in the short-
term, riots ultimately make campaigns more likely to end. This is consistent with the claim that 
riots “scare off” potential participation and thus undermines the likelihood of mass-
mobilization and accelerates the collapse of ongoing campaigns. 
 
Varieties of violence in nonviolent campaigns 
There are two main approaches to exploring nonviolent resistance. In the first approach, studies 
of civil resistance have found that nonviolent campaigns seem to succeed more often than 
armed campaigns, and more likely to see subsequent political change such as transitions to 
democracy (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 201-219; Rivera and Gleditsch 2013: 393-397). 
However, this research is often limited to comparing measures of success across organized 
nonviolent and armed campaigns rather than considering the emergence of nonviolent 
campaigns or dynamics of mobilization over time. This is important since many cases of initial 
protest and nonviolent mobilization, such as the case of Mozambique discussed above, fail to 
become a large-scale nonviolent campaign. Civil resistance literature also speaks less to the 
factors influencing the growth of mobilization and its sustainability over time, such as violence, 
(Butcher and Svensson 2016; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017).  
Civil resistance literature largely classified individual dissident campaigns as either 
violent or nonviolent in a dichotomous manner, based on primary tactics that are deploy, thus 
largely exploring nonviolent and violent forms in isolation. A second approach, looking at 
social movements more broadly, insist that contentious politics often involves the sequencing 
of both violence and nonviolent dissent, and rejects the largely isolationist approach of civil 
resistance literature (e.g., Collins 2009; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; della Porta and Diani 
2006; Seferiades and Johnston 2012; Davenport 2014). Such scholars emphasize sequencing 
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and substitution of tactics in contentious politics tend to emphasize explicit adoption of tactics, 
for example when movements turn to nonviolent direct action if conventional channels are 
blocked, or shift to other repertoires of resistance, i.e. organized rioting, sabotage or armed 
violence, if nonviolence proves ineffective or if violence is seen as justified in light of state 
repression (McAdam 1982; McAdam, Tarrow and Zald 1996; McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 2001; 
della Porta and Diani 2006).  
Nevertheless, to what extent sequencing is the case or a problem for conclusions 
ultimately depends on the type of dissent and the specific forms of violence we focus on. There 
are important conceptual differences in the types of violence that may arise during nonviolent 
dissent, based on the agents using force and the degree to which this is organized and 
coordinated.4   Dissent is often repressed, and it is conventional to delimit nonviolent dissent 
based on dissident tactics rather than government responses.5 Violence initiated by factions 
within a dissident campaign could be explicitly organized or coordinated, or unorganized 
actions without any active coordination or advance planning.  
On the one hand, nonviolent dissident campaigns relatively infrequently turn into 
extensive organized violence or armed rebellion. Across our data, there are few cases where 
organizations deliberate switch from one tactic to the other, with notable exceptions being best-
known examples such as the African National Congress in South Africa (Asal et al. 2013: 306-
307; Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: 418-419). In Libya and Syria, organized armed violence 
emerged after initial nonviolent protest, and came to dominate other tactics, but emerged 
largely from defection from the government and the army rather than initial dissident groups 
changing tactics. Shifts to organized violence become slightly more common if we also include 
violent fringe groups and unconventional warfare such as terrorism, but organized violence 
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remains relatively infrequent even by these more encompassing measurers (Belgioioso et al. 
2019: 285; Dudouet 2013: 403). 
On the other hand, less organized forms of violence such as riots or disorganized clashes 
with the police appear to be much more common during nonviolent protest campaigns. While 
incidental violence is common in many nonviolent campaigns, the impact of such violence on 
otherwise nonviolent protest and ongoing nonviolent campaigns remains poorly understood in 
both approaches. Existing civil resistance literature has not directly accounted for the impact 
of rioting and studies on violent flanks remain focused on organized and militarized armed 
groups. In contrast, social movement literature has extensively explored waves of contention 
and shifts between nonviolent and violent protest; where rioting represents an important shift 
in tactics, often emerging in response to state repression and emerging radicalism (Tarrow 
1989; Traugott 1995; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Seferiades and Johnston 2012; della 
Porta and Fillieule 2004; della Porta and Diani 2006), Yet this literature also tells us little about 
the impact incidental violence has on the onset and fate of nonviolent resistance campaigns. 
Social movement literature also makes assumptions about the level of organization 
within rioting that emerges during nonviolent resistance.6 Yet the lack of coordination and 
organization in most riots is not consistent with Tilly’s (1986: 4) emphasis on repertoires as 
the range of means for “making claims”. The SCAD data distinguishes between organized riots 
(with identifiable organizers) and spontaneous riots, in which 88% of recorded rioting fall in 
the second category.  
A much more common form of violence during nonviolent campaigns is unorganized 
violence without planning or coordination such as individuals fighting with the police and riots. 
Bringing people together in mass nonviolent dissent creates situations that are potentially 
volatile. Individuals may resort to violence against police or security forces, without any prior 
10 
 
planning or advance warning. Much of the violence during nonviolent campaigns, such as the 
incidents discussed in Mozambique, have been precisely such spontaneous acts often driven 
by emotions and outbursts of anger rather than clear political strategies or strategic goals (e.g., 
Seferiades and Johnson 2012: 12-13). It is very common that participants in a campaign start 
to fight with the police, or throw rocks or primitive incendiary devices, yet this is rarely 
coordinated or planned in advance. Collins (2009: 39-73) emphasizes how violence is often 
opportunistic, typically lashing out against weak, immediate and often random targets. 
Unorganized violence can be facilitated by the anonymity afforded in crowds, where 
individuals are less at risk of retribution. Disorganized violence faces much lower barriers than 
resorting to organized violence, as it does not require coordination, planning or entail future 
commitments. Sociological studies of violence such Collins (2009: 94) emphasize 
“confrontational tensions” and fear as an emotional state, where people often respond with 
generally disorganized and often incompetent acts of violence. 
There is also an extensive literature on the origins of riots, who participates and the 
diffusion of riots, often focused on race riots in the US (e.g., Blau and Blau 1982; Mason and 
Murtagh 1985; Olzak 1987), historical protest behavior and riots in Europe or recent riots in 
cities such as London or Paris (e.g. Aidt et al. 2017; Aidt and Leon 2015; Kawalerowicz and 
Biggs 2015; Moran and Waddington, 2015; Newburn, 2016; Seferiades and Johnston 2012; 
della Porta and Fillieule 2004; della Porta and Diani 2006; Opp 2009). Some riots occur amid 
a backdrop of organized political dissent, but not all organized dissent evolves into large-scale 
campaigns, and most studies do not focus on how riots may affect nonviolent campaigns with 
maximalist claims on the government.  
Despite the ambiguous impact of rioting, many activists also see rioting as disorganized 
from of violence and something to try to avoid rather than an explicit tactic in their arsenal 
11 
 
(Popovic and Miller 2015: 195-214). Likewise, some case studies have concluded that the risk 
of disorganized violence poses a clear challenge for movements seeking to maintain nonviolent 
discipline and broad public support (Bhavnani and Jha 2014: 77-79; Pearlman 2011: 2). 
Building on activist accounts, civil resistance literature also broadly argues that nonviolent 
discipline is important tactic that promotes backfire; the reduction of state authority that 
deploys violent repression. For state repression to generate backfire, organizers of nonviolent 
resistance usually must avoid violent backlash to state repression (Pinckney 2016; 35-67; 
Martin 2007; 123-124; also see Sutton, Butcher and Svensson 2014).  
This is something also highlighted by social movement literature, which argues the 
tactical interaction between protesters and oppressors are critical in determining backfire and 
changes in repertoire of dissent. For instance, the violent repression of the civil rights 
movement in the US was important in sustaining the movement and contributed to the 
intervention of federal soldiers (McAdam 1982). From this is the implicit suggestion that 
incidental violence is an important determinant of dynamics of nonviolent mobilization and 
whether nonviolent campaigns can successfully emerge and whether they can survive amid 
interactions with the state. 
Yet, since existing research has largely focused on escalations to organized violent 
dissent and its interaction with otherwise nonviolent dissent, we have few insights into the 
consequences of unorganized violence for nonviolent mobilization. Focusing on the dissidents’ 
primary tactics and the explicit shifts in primary campaign strategies during protest is in some 
ways akin to looking for the effects of violence under a well-lit but rather peripheral lamppost. 
Since unorganized violence such as riots or crowd violence are common during protests it is 
remarkable that there has not been more attention to their consequences for nonviolent 
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mobilization. In the next section we turn to the challenges in starting and maintaining 
nonviolent campaigns, detailing potential negative and positive effects of incidental violence. 
 
Getting off the ground and sustaining a nonviolent campaign 
Maximalist political dissent seeks to challenge the government through imposing costs. 
Whereas violent dissent seeks to coerce a government through killing and the ramifications of 
violence, nonviolent dissent tries to force a government to make concessions using techniques 
such as nonviolent intervention, noncompliance, and persuasion. Effective nonviolent action 
depends on the ability of activists to mobilize large numbers of people (DeNardo 1985: 58-86; 
Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 30-61; Schock 2005: 38-42). Nonviolent movements have more 
leverage to undermine the legitimacy of the state and its ability to rule when they can mobilize 
large numbers or demonstrate that they can garner broad support (Schock 2005:52-53; Nepstad 
2015: 94). Of course, violent movements also benefit from more extensive participation, but 
they are less sensitive to a minimum threshold, and can often exert a non-trivial impact with 
limited participation.  
Mobilizing people to participate at the outset of a nonviolent campaign is often 
extremely difficult. Large participation provides “safety in numbers” and allows participants 
to overcome fear and publicly express grievances they previously kept private (Pearlman 2016: 
26-27). But nonviolent campaigns must initially manage to cross a critical minimum 
“participation threshold” and maintain numbers to have a notable political impact (Kuran 1991: 
16-19; Lohmann 1994: 49-56). Mobilization and collective action hinges on individual 
perceptions that many others will also participate as well as maintaining high participation in 




How riots could undermine nonviolent mobilization 
Activists stress the need for movements to avoid violence and its potential detrimental effects 
for achieving large-scale popular participation. For example, widely-used training manuals 
developed for activists emphasize the role of strategy, unity, and nonviolent discipline in 
achieving large participation (Popovic and Miller 2015: 195-214, see also Martin 2007: 123-
124; Nepstad 2015: 92-97; Sharp 2005: 387-414). From this perspective, disorganized violence 
is antithetical to nonviolent discipline, and a threat to the ability of movements to achieve large 
participation and maintain unity throughout the campaign.  
Extensive incidents of unorganized violence can damage nonviolent campaigns by 
alienating moderates and deter potential participants from joining the movement. Research on 
the negative impact of violent flanks often highlights how violence can discredit a campaign 
and make it more difficult to elicit defection by government supporters, which is often key to 
political success (Chenoweth and Schock 2015; Nepstad 2015; Sharp 2005: 397-414). 
Disorganized violence can undermine reaching the initial participation thresholds and 
maintaining participation. Despite the stereotype of contagious fights and bar brawls, people 
often respond with fear and flee when confronted with dangerous situations that entail a high 
risk of violence (Collins 2009: 10-19; Elster 2009: 57-62). Thus, extensive disorganized 
violence is likely to undermine initial mobilization and suppress subsequent participation, 
thereby promoting the collapse of campaigns. 
Beyond the direct impacts on participation, disorganized violence may provoke and 
justify state repression against all challengers. Since repression is often indiscriminate and not 
limited to just rioters, fear of retribution can deter involvement by all potential participants. In 
Mozambique for example, state repression undermined nonviolent dissent from gaining 
momentum in both 2010 and 2012. Regimes often look for ways to discredit their opponent 
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and justify state repression, and in some cases introduce agent provocateurs to instigate 
violence to help undermine a political campaign (Nepstad 2015: 98). Disorganized violence 
and riots make it less likely that security forces will disobey government orders and defect, and 
in turn also less likely that repression will backfire (Chenoweth and Schock 2015: 428; 
Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 50-59). Finally, disorganized violence from violent fringe 
groups can alienate moderate allies (Wasow 2017: 8-9), particularly would-be participants 
from social groups closer to the regime, which undermines intergroup coalitions that are often 
essential to encouraging broader participation (Nepstad 2015: 91). If these arguments about the 
negative consequences of disorganized violence are correct, then we should expect more rioting 
to reduce the likelihood of initial large-scale nonviolent mobilization, and more likely that 
ongoing campaigns will collapse. From this we derive the first hypotheses: 
H1a: Riots make the onset of a large-scale nonviolent anti-government campaign less 
likely. 
H1b: Large-scale nonviolent anti-government campaigns are more likely to collapse 
following the presence of riots. 
 
The potential mobilizing effects of riots 
Although disorganized violence could have negative effects on nonviolent mobilization, a 
plausible opposing viewpoint holds that riots can mobilize nonviolent protest. Since riots and 
protest can occur at the same time, the two are clearly not inherently incompatible. Social 
movement literature suggests that forms of dissent are relational and can co-evolve over time 
as dissidents interact with each other, as well as with the police and other state apparatus. 
Increasing escalation and rioting may be purposeful tactics and evolving attempts at claim 
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making amid rounds of repression, which may trigger further waves of nonviolent protest and 
greater participation (Tilly, 1986; Seferiades and Johnston 2012: 7-18; della Porta and Fillieule 
2004: 233-235; della Porta and Diani 2006: 182-210). Moreover, the existing literature on the 
diffusion of riots suggests a number of potential mobilizing effects, as events in one location 
grow over time and spread in space to other locations (see Aidt et al. 2017; Aidt and Leon 
2015; Kawalerowicz and Biggs 2015). 
First, acts of disorganized violence can help draw attention to events, disseminate 
dissatisfaction to others in the target audience for mobilization, and heighten the sense of a 
crisis for the government (Ketchley 2017: 18-45). Disseminating such information is a key 
challenge in political mobilization. The barriers for participation are lowered when people see 
how dissatisfaction is widely shared and become more likely to believe that others will 
participate (Kuran 1991: 18; Lohmann 1994: 49). From this perspective, riots can “make news 
by making noise” or help generate momentum for a campaign (Thrall 2006: 417). Indeed, riots 
may draw more attention than purely nonviolent demonstrations, which government often 
ignore and potentially censored media do not report. Moreover, the emotional aspects of riots 
and perceived frustrations could help signal the depth of perceived injustice and the extreme 
steps that people are willing to take, in turn encouraging further participation (Seferiades and 
Johnston 2012: 14). 
Second, disorganized violence and riots may unleash state repression, but repression 
can in some settings help nonviolent mobilization. Campaigns often involve a complex set of 
factions, and some have suggested that violent flanks can help generate an advantage for the 
moderate factions (Gamson, 1990: 81; Haines, 1988: 171; Piven and Cloward, 1988: 149-173). 
Riots during nonviolent campaigns may help moderate factions in a movement to distinguish 
themselves from violent factions and potentially divert repression away from the moderate 
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factions (Chenoweth and Schock 2015: 428). Riots that arise in response to state repression 
may be perceived as justified, and repression could backfire in growing nonviolent 
mobilization rather than deterring participation (Ketchley 2017; Kadivar and Ketchley 2018: 
3-4). Images of children throwing stones against Israeli armored vehicles during the first 
intifada, for example, helped to draw attention to the plight of the Palestinians and the 
magnitude of Israeli repression, and increased support for the campaign. In the United States, 
indiscriminate police responses to rioting during protest events are often seen as playing into 
the hands of activists calling for reform in law enforcement and the judicial system (Glaser and 
Sunstein 2015: 6-7). These arguments suggest two alternative hypotheses on the positive 
effects of riots: 
H2a: Riots increase the likely onset of large-scale nonviolent anti-government 
campaigns. 
H2b: Riots help sustain large-scale nonviolent mobilization meaning nonviolent anti-
government campaigns are less likely to collapse following incidents of rioting. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
We use two data sources to evaluate the competing hypotheses on the effects of riots on 
nonviolent campaigns. In our first analyses we consider the emergence of nonviolent 
campaigns involving maximalist nonviolent claims in a sample of 170 countries with a 
population over 500,000 (in 2010).7 We combine data on primarily nonviolent campaigns from 
the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcome data (NAVCO, Chenoweth and Lewis 
2013), which end in 2006, with information for 2007-2013 from the Major Episodes of 
Contention (MEC) data, an extension of the NAVCO data presented in Chenoweth and 
Ulfelder (2017: 310-312). We use the number of riots events in the previous year from the 
Cross-National Time Series Data Archive (CNTS), coded from reports by the New York Times 
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(Banks and Wilson 2013). Riots are defined here as violent and physically forceful clashes 
involving at least 100 participants. We estimate a logit model of campaign onset given riots, 
with robust standard errors clustered on countries. Exploring a global dataset allows us to assess 
166 onsets of nonviolent campaigns, and how rioting impacts the emergence of nonviolent 
campaigns in a global sample. 
In our second set of analysis we assess campaign termination as a measure of the 
sustainability of campaigns. We consider the impact on termination from riot events in the 
Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD, Salehyan et al. 2012) that occur during an active 
nonviolent campaign in Africa and Central America between 1990 and 2013. The fact that 
SCAD provides information on the specific dates of riot events, enables us to look at a much 
more detailed timeline of rioting preceding the potential collapse of a campaign at the monthly 
level.8 We use a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the influence of rioting upon the 
hazard rate of the termination of a campaign. Out of the 40 campaigns in our sample, 36 
terminate before 2013. 
It would be ideal to have detailed data on the scale of protest to trace the effects of riots, 
but existing data have at best imperfect measures of protest magnitude. The most useful direct 
measure, the number of participants, is only available as an ordinal scale in orders of magnitude 
in the NAVCO data, and as a peak figure for each year. SCAD in principle includes data on 
participation in events, but this is missing in practice for about 60% of the events. Relying on 
the counting of protest events as a proxy for participation is problematic. There is no clear 
theoretical relationship between the number of events and the number of participants in the 
events – a count of three small event with 25 participants could appear larger than a single 
event with 1000 participants, the correspondence between the recorded number of events and 
participation is low in existing sources (Biggs 2018: 353). Moreover, the problems are 
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compounded by often ambiguous rules for delineating events. We thus focus on how riots affect 
onset and termination of major nonviolent campaigns with participation thresholds of at least 
1,000 people, as these data are at least better defined and have better coverage than the limited 
information on the number of participants. 
We use different units of analysis and riot measures in the two analyses given the data 
coverage and the relative pros and cons of the sources. The CNTS riot measure is available for 
a larger period, but only as annual counts, without precise dates. The more fine-grained SCAD 
data allow us to consider the sequence and timing of events in detail in our analysis of campaign 
termination, and SCAD distinguishes between four distinct types of riots, based on their 
potential relationship to protest and motivation. We use a measure all riots that combines 
SCAD riot events that specifically start out as riots (fringe riots) and events that escalate from 
protest into rioting (which we label as escalatory rioting). We then consider riots which 
specially target the government, followed by separate analyses of government targeted fringe 
riots and escalatory riots.9 However, the fact that SCAD data are limited to countries in Africa 
and Central America and the 1990-2013 period limits this analysis to 40 campaigns (37 of 
which emerge during this period). The SCAD data records 1139 riots across 271 campaign 
months, while 772 campaign months see no riot events. 
It would also be ideal to consider the number of participants in riots, but we have similar 
problems here as for protest size. Although SCAD reports participation for some riots, this is 
missing for almost 70% of the observations. Counting events is further complicated by the 
location information, as 16% of the riot events in SCAD are classified as “nationwide”, 
“regional”, or “unknown” location. The nationwide events are often major riots or events in 
many simultaneous locations, yet counted as a single event. Counting these as one and “less 
significant” than a series of more easily differentiable events in distinct locations could be 
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severely misleading (see Biggs 2018: 353). Abbs (2019) proposes a procedure to estimate event 
counts for nationwide and regional events based on the most likely locations, using other event 
characteristics, which we adapt here. He notes that the vast majority of SCAD geocoded riot 
and protest events occur in cities with a population over 100,000. “Nationwide” riots are 
assumed to be occurring in the capital and the country’s five largest cities, if above 100,000 
inhabitants. Regional events are coded as occurring in the five largest cities in the region.10  
We control for a number of other features plausibly associated with nonviolent 
campaign onset or termination and the likelihood of rioting. First, we control for a number of 
important demographic, economic and political variables. This includes controls for logged 
population and logged GDP per capita (World Bank, 2016). Larger countries are likely to see 
nonviolent action and rioting than smaller countries, while in poorer countries, poverty may 
create motives for protest and rioting and governments tend to be weaker and have less capacity 
to deter unrest. We also control for the share of urban population (World Bank, 2016), since 
urbanization facilitates mobilization by reducing coordination and communication costs and 
potentially riots as well (Goldstone 1991; Wallace 2013).  
We also consider the potential mobilizing effect of elections (e.g., Bunce and Wolchik 
2011), using information from the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy data 
(Hyde and Marinov 2012), and regime type using the Polity democracy scale. Political 
institutions may be associated with both incentives and prospects for nonviolent mobilization 
and rioting (Marshall et al. 2017). Moreover, non-democracies provide more motives for 
protest, but authoritarian regimes are more likely to repress opportunities for mobilization 
(Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). 
Next we control for time dependences, by time since the last onset of a campaign and 
cubic splines to allow for a non-linear relationship (Beck and Katz, 2011). In the country-level 
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analysis on campaign onset we also consider the number of CNTS anti-government 
demonstrations and strikes in the previous year to capture the growth in initial mobilization.11  
Finally, we control for violence that occurs outside of the nonviolent campaign. This 
includes controls for state repression, which may be correlated with riots and have a mobilizing 
effect, even if intended to make dissent more costly and deter dissent (Sharp 2005; Sutton, 
Butcher and Svensson 2014). For the campaign onset analysis we use the Varieties of 
Democracy (V-Dem) Physical Integrity Rights Index (Coppedge et al., 2017), which provides 
full coverage for our sample. In the campaign termination analysis we use a more fine grained 
measure of repression, namely the ratio of SCAD events met with repression in the prior month, 
including separate indicators for nonlethal and lethal repression.  
In the termination analysis we also consider possible regional differences between 
campaigns in Africa and campaign in Central America and the Caribbean, and control for 
organized violence that can occur during a nonviolent campaign. We include the number of 
terrorist attacks carried out by nonstate actors, taken from the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD) (START 2012), and the number of armed conflict incidents using the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program’s Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg and Melander 2013). 
 
Nonviolent campaign onset 
We first evaluate the impact of rioting on nonviolent campaigns onset. H1a stipulates that since 
unorganized violence tends to “scare off” potential participants, we should be less likely to see 
a large-scale campaign starting after rioting. By contrast, if riots and unorganized violence has 
a mobilizing effect, as stated by the competing proposition H2a, then we should see a higher 
likelihood of a nonviolent campaign onset following riots.  
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Table 1 displays the results for the logistic regressions of campaign onset. In Model 1 
we simply consider the count of riots at t-1, without other control variables. With this 
specification, rioting at t-1 appears to be positively associated with the likelihood of a major 
campaign starting in the subsequent year (t). This seems consistent with hypothesis H2a and a 
mobilizing effect of riots, indicating how people are “ticked off”.  However, we think this 
specification is flawed, as it does not consider the mobilizing effect of previous protest and the 
potential common trending in riots and growing protest activity. In Model 2 we consider a 
model with all the control variables and prior protest activity at t-1. It is clear that more protests 
at t-1 goes together with a higher likelihood that we will see a major nonviolent campaign at t. 
The results for the control variables in Model 2 are generally consistent with previous 
research; we find that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to emerge in more urbanized 
countries, with larger populations, and during election years. Nonviolent campaigns are more 
likely in more urbanized countries, and actually appear to be less likely the higher a country’s 
per capita income. Finally, campaigns are less likely when the V-Dem physical integrity index 
is lower, indicating higher state repression, i.e. greater use of torture and more political killings. 
In Model 3 we show that the apparent positive effects of riots at t-1 on mobilization 
shrinks strongly towards 0 when we consider control variables, and is no longer statistically 
significant. More dramatically, we show in Model 4 that when we also include the level prior 
protest in Model 4 to account for trending in protest – which may be also associated with riots 
- the coefficient estimate for riots at (t-1) turns negative and statistically significant. This is 
consistent with hypothesis H1a, postulating that a major nonviolent campaign is less likely 
after rioting, since rioting “scares off” potential participants in a major nonviolent campaign.12 
Note that we control for repression through the V-Dem physical integrity index, and as 
such the negative effect for riots cannot be seen as simply reflecting that repression after riots 
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suppresses protest. We further assess this potential mediating effect in our models by exploring 
the interaction effect of rioting and state repression (see Table 3 in the Appendix – model 9). 
This interaction has no significant effect on the onset of nonviolent campaigns. Even when 
including this interaction in the model, the results remain the same. While there is interplay 
between rioting, repression and nonviolent protest, the impact of rioting on the onset of a 
nonviolent campaign is not dependent on the presence of state repression. 
 
Table 1. Logistic regressions - rioting and the onset of nonviolent campaigns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
Riot Events (Banks) t-1 0.106***  0.021 -0.086* 
 (0.022)  (0.030) (0.041) 
Protest Events (Banks) t-1  0.124***  0.169*** 
  (0.029)  (0.034) 
National Population (log)  0.303*** 0.356*** 0.318*** 
  (0.061) (0.058) (0.063) 
Urban Population (%)  0.027*** 0.028*** 0.026** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
GDP per Capita (log)  -0.566*** -0.554*** -0.572*** 
  (0.149) (0.149) (0.150) 
Polity2  -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Election Year  0.582** 0.590** 0.587** 
  (0.182) (0.180) (0.183) 
V-Dem Physical Integrity   -0.808+ -0.845+ -0.815+ 
Index  (0.466) (0.464) (0.470) 
Years since last NVC  -0.165* -0.220** -0.168* 
  (0.075) (0.074) (0.074) 
Spline1  -0.002+ -0.002* -0.002+ 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Spline2  0.001 0.001+ 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Spline3  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -3.834*** -5.148*** -5.747*** -5.285*** 
 (0.118) (1.414) (1.348) (1.406) 
Observations 5825 5822 5822 5822 
Log likelihood -621.973 -568.181 -574.848 -566.461 
Chi-squared 23.26 150.078 118.857 157.129 
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.093 0.083 0.096 
  Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Riots and campaign termination 
We now turn to the effects of riots on the hazard of nonviolent campaign termination. If 
incidental violence “scares off” participants and alienates potential supporters, as suggested by 
H1b, then we should see an increased likelihood of nonviolent campaign termination following 
riots. However, if violence has a mobilizing effect, as postulated by H2b, termination should 
become less likely following incidents of rioting. We evaluate these competing arguments 
about the effects of riots on campaign termination through a series of Cox proportional hazard 
models, where we also consider the other covariates that may influence both rioting and the 
likelihood of campaign termination. 
Table 2 reports the estimates for a series of different model specifications using 
different riot measures. We lag all time-varying covariates by one month, and report robust 
standard errors clustered by countries. The Cox proportional hazard model indicates how 
covariates affect the underlying baseline hazard, without assuming a specific form for the 
baseline hazard. Hence, a positive coefficient in the model estimates indicates that a covariate 
is associated with a higher hazard of campaign termination, while a negative coefficient 
indicates a lower hazard of campaign termination, which in turn leads to longer expected 
campaigns.   
In Models 6-8 we disaggregate the overall riot variable into specific subtypes in order 
to examine if different types of riots may have substantively different effects. We distinguish 
between riots that specifically target the government, which could be seen as the riots which 
exhibit the clearest political motivation (Model 6), fringe events that start out as a riot, and 
which may simply occur alongside a nonviolent campaign (Model 7), and escalatory rioting, 
which originates and escalate from a protest event, but may be less coordinated or connected 
to an ongoing campaign (Model 8). 
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Table 2. Cox proportional hazard models – duration and termination of nonviolent campaigns 
  Standard errors in parentheses   + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
In Model 5 we first consider a compound term for all types of rioting in SCAD (both 
government and non-government targets) on campaign termination. We find a positive and 
significant coefficient estimate, indicating that riots generally increase the likelihood of 
campaign termination. This is consistent with the argument that the dominant effect of 
incidental violence is to undermine nonviolent campaigns. However, it is contrary to the claim 









All Riots (t-1) 0.112**    
 (0.034)    
Govt. Targeted Riots (t-1)  0.116**   
  (0.042)   
Fringe Riots Only (t-1)   0.132**  
   (0.043)  
Escalatory Riots Only (t-1)    0.209** 
    (0.068) 
Population - logged (t-1)  -0.464 -0.456 -0.478 
 (0.376) (0.381) (0.365) (0.371) 
Urban Population (%)  -0.004 0.003 0.004 -0.006 
(t-1) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.035) 
GDP per Capita - logged  0.122 -0.036 -0.041 0.159 
(t-1) (0.634) (0.599) (0.610) (0.619) 
Polity2 (t-1) 0.075 0.081 0.078 0.070 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.052) 
Africa (Regional Dummy) 0.774 0.653 0.703 0.714 
 (0.554) (0.550) (0.538) (0.562) 
Elections (t-1) 0.486 0.439 0.457 0.478 
 (0.392) (0.377) (0.385) (0.384) 
Ratio of Nonlethal Repression 0.192 0.138 0.142 0.173 
– SCAD (t-1) (0.575) (0.570) (0.554) (0.574) 
Ratio of Lethal Repression 2.141** 2.102** 1.950** 2.516** 
– SCAD (t-1) (0.648) (0.651) (0.680) (0.586) 
Terrorism Events – GTD (t-1) 0.271** 0.301** 0.317** 0.293** 
 (0.062) (0.060) (0.060) (0.051) 
Armed Conflict Events – UCDP GED -0.138 -0.180 -0.103 -0.633 
(t-1) (0.402) (0.498) (0.368) (0.760) 
Observations 964 964 964 964 
NVC Terminations 36 36 36 36 
Log likelihood -72.799 -75.090 -74.780 -74.843 
Chi-squared 53.429 44.925 52.042 43.055 
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that riots tend to have a mobilizing effect on sustaining protest. At a minimum, a campaign 
must remain active to have some political impact, and riots appear to make this less likely.  
Few of the control covariates appear to have consistent effects on the likelihood of 
campaign termination. The Polity democracy measure is positive and marginally significant in 
some specifications. But the only control variables that are consistently significant are lethal 
repression and terrorism events. Violence from state repression and terrorist non-state actors 
are associated with a higher rate of termination. By controlling for these we can ensure that the 
estimated impact of rioting does not reflect effects of organized violence. 
 Controlling for state repression also does not impact the results concerning any of the 
riot variables, thus the negative impact of rioting during a nonviolent campaign is not reflection 
of state suppression after rioting has occurred. We also find no evidence of a possible 
interaction effect between repression and rioting during nonviolent campaigns (see Table 3 in 
the appendix – models 10-13). Rioting undermines the momentum of nonviolent campaigns, 
but this effect is independent of and not dependent on the existence of state repression. 
 




It is clear from Figure 2 that all the estimated riot coefficients are consistently positive. 
Moreover, measures of model fit in Table 2 do not suggest that any one of the models, with the 
specialized riot, measures fit the data notably better than the model with the compound riots 
measure. The fact that the coefficient for initially nonviolent protest escalating into riots is the 
largest could be seen as support for the idea that violent flanks within nonviolent movements 
are most likely to precede nonviolent campaign collapse, but there is little evidence for any 
clear differential impacts of different types of riots, since all types of riots consistently increase 
the likelihood that a campaign will end.13 In general, the results here are consistent with the 
claim idea that riots and disorganized violence scare people off and undermine the viability of 
movements. 
It could be argued that campaign termination is ambiguous outcome, since campaigns 
could end both due to internal failures of a movement or changes in the context motivating the 
campaign – i.e., if a government makes concessions. The strong correlation between campaign 
duration and the cumulative likelihood of riots over the course of a campaign means that many 
campaigns classified as successful in NAVCO see riots at some point. NAVCO 2.0 provides 
measures intended to code whether campaigns are successful or not , although these only covers 
up until 2006 and we have no such information in the MEC data for the subsequent period. We 
find no evidence that full success campaigns are systematically shorter, nor that rioting is more 
common in the fully successful campaigns; rioting is more common in successful campaigns 
(35.3% of campaign months) than in unsuccessful campaigns (24.8% campaign months). Thus, 
we do not think that riots lead to higher rates of success and or that the type of termination 






Conclusion and discussion 
Disorganized violence such as riots often occur alongside nonviolent protest, but previous 
research provides few clues as to how riots may influence political mobilization. We provide 
what is to our knowledge the first analysis of how riots affect the likelihood of nonviolent mass 
mobilization and the sustainability of nonviolent campaigns. We note the divergent pessimistic 
expectations of activists, who tend to emphasize the detrimental effects for nonviolent 
movements, with the potential mobilizing effect, where riots are seen as helping to promote 
protest and mobilize further dissent by showing how many within society are “ticked off”. 
Our findings point strongly towards riots having generally negative effects on 
nonviolent activism, in line with the argument that riots tend to “scare off” potential 
participants, thus undermining the prospects for large campaigns and increasing the likelihood 
that ongoing campaigns will collapse. The apparent mobilizing effects of riots are illusory, and 
reflect that riots often increase in scale with more protest. The partial effect of riots and the 
long-run consequences appear to be consistently negative when we consider both the scale of 
prior riots and protest. Converting nonviolent mobilization into a long-term campaign is better 
helped by maintaining nonviolent discipline and preventing riots rather than trying to capitalize 
on them, and movements are unlikely to see substantial growth in participation from rioting 
alone. Riots do not necessarily kill all campaigns immediately, but they do entail a higher risk 
of campaigns ending in the short run, in line with the concerns expressed by activists. In short, 
disorganized violence is likely to be far less threatening to leaders than organized nonviolent 
protests, and the fact that government often try to instigate violence during nonviolent dissent 
suggests that they understand how this can help “scare off” potential participants. For this 
reason, governments are unlikely to be particularly afraid of riots, despite their potentially 
uncontrollable nature, but have good reasons to fear organized and growing nonviolent protest. 
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Our findings here also help to account for the divergent outcomes of nonviolent 
campaigns and suggest that rioting can be an important and leading indicator of failing 
campaigns, as seen in the events in Iran during late 2017 and early 2018. The protests that 
began in the city of Mashhad on 28 December 2017 quickly spread to other cities and became 
the largest challenge to the regime since the Green Revolution protests after the disputed 
elections in 2009. However, while the 2009 uprising lasted for months, and eventually 
encompassed more than a million active participants, the 2017-18 protests saw much lower 
participation and started to decline after just one week. The extent of rioting and property 
damage allowed the government to justify a strong repressive response, and likely alienated 
many plausible would-be protesters. A better coordinated movement could have helped prevent 
disorganize violence and attract broader participation, thus making it harder for the government 
to undermine the legitimacy of the protests. 
Our analyses are suggestive about the detrimental consequences of riots for large-scale 
nonviolent resistance, but we also acknowledge the limitations of our analysis. In particular, 
since we lack direct measures of participation, it is difficult to trace in more detail the short and 
long-term impact of riots. This is in principle possible to do with more detailed time series 
analysis for individual countries, although there is likely to be great deal of variation from one 
country to another, and thus important to consider to what extent individual countries 
trajectories are likely to be representative for general trends and patterns. Moreover, we are not 
able to directly evaluate individual responses to riots in our current analysis - that is, whether 
riots genuinely have more impact on “scaring off” potential individual participants than helping 
to convey how others are “ticked off” and willing to take extreme measures, despite the 
potential risks. It may be possible to evaluate these mechanisms more directly using public 
opinion data and experimental approaches.  
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Finally, we also concede that the consequences of unorganized violence and riots can 
also depend on a host of other issues, such as framing, as well as the broader competitive 
interactions surrounding dissent. In some cases, a government can successfully discredit a 
nonviolent movement by highlighting incidental violence as demonstrating the true “violent” 
and disorderly character, as appears to have been successful in the case in Iran. However, 
movements may be more resilient if they can successfully “counterframe”, and place the blame 
more directly on the government, and riots are seen as resulting from justified outrage, even if 
the method itself is not condoned. Here again it may be possible to devise experimental tests 
to provide a way to test the importance of such strategies directly.  However, this study clearly 
demonstrates the importance of riots and unorganized violence for nonviolent dissent and its 
outcomes. The important challenges that this can create for both dissident movements and 
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1 To be clear on the key concepts, we here consider nonviolent mobilization in terms of 
organized and largescale campaigns with a clear political motive. Chenoweth and Stephan 
(2011: 14-15) define campaigns as “a series of observable, continual tactics in pursuit of a 
political objective”, using various forms of the 198 nonviolent methods outlined by Sharp 
(2005). They distinguish between violent and nonviolent campaigns, based on the primary 
tactics used. This definition highlights active organization and the deliberate intent in choosing 
nonviolent direct action tactics. By protest, we mean specifically nonviolent protest using 
nonviolent tactics. We refer to Sharp (2005: 49-60) who notes 198 methods of specifically 
nonviolent resistance and consolidates this into three broad categories: persuasion (i.e. peaceful 
protests and demonstrations), non-cooperation (i.e. peaceful strikes and boycotts), and 
intervention (i.e. peaceful sit-ins and the overloading of state institutions). Our data contains 
individual, coordinated nonviolent anti-government events, which use a combination of these 
methods either leading up to, or taking place during campaigns. By riots, we mean “distinct, 
continuous and violent action directed toward members of a distinct ‘other’ group or 
government authorities” (see Salehyan and Hendrix 2012: 4). We see riots largely as a form of 
unorganized and uncoordinated violence which may or may not be present during and/or prior 
to otherwise nonviolent protests and nonviolent campaigns. Seferiades and Johnston (2012: 16) 
emphasize how riots can emerge from fringe groups in otherwise peaceful protests, or escalate 
from initial protests that become violent, often as response to police or state repression. This 
corresponds closely to what Tilly (2003: 15-16) refers to as “scattered attacks” and “broken 
negotiations”. Riots are often referred to as a form of violent protest but are not always evidence 
in otherwise nonviolent incidents of resistance. In some cases rioting in more prevalent during 





campaign with emerge or collapse given the degree of rioting that occurs during initial protests 
and ongoing nonviolent campaigns. 
2 Based on personal communications with Siniša Šikman. 
3 The NAVCO data (and the related MEC data after 2006) identify maximalist campaigns with 
more than 1000 participants, including campaigns that have nonviolent primary tactics. We 
explain these data sources in greater detail later. 
4 Many activities are “not violent”. Our focus here is on what Sharp (2005: 543-548) calls 
nonviolent direct action, with claims on the government or regime change, using methods that 
are both a) nonviolent and b) direct action, outside conventional political channels or in 
contravention of what the state orders or permits, such as illegal strikes or protests. Many “not 
violent” activities, for example routine politics permitted within a system, or activities without 
a political claim, fall outside of our definition of nonviolent action.  
5 Nonviolent dissent is often met by government violence, but definitions of nonviolent tactics 
emphasize whether dissidents respond with violence and the extent to which this is organized 
or an explicit tactic. Similarly, definitions of civil war do not extend to events with one-sided 
state repression or violence against unorganized individuals, unless the non-state actor also 
confronts the state using organized armed violence. Pre-emptive state repression can deter 
mass-mobilization altogether (Davenport 2007; Ritter and Conrad 2016). 
6 We focus on riots as a case of unorganized violence during dissent in our analysis, but also 
consider potential differential effects of more or less organized riots. We focus on riots, since 
we have reasonably good cross-national data, but we believe our arguments should extend to 
other forms of unorganized violence not recorded in existing data such as fighting with the 





disorganized violence during dissent. As such, it is instructive that disorganized violence seems 
so common during dissent, even with our restricted focus on riots.  
7 The NAVCO data are based on the Chenoweth and Stephan (2011: 14-5) definition a 
campaign (fn. 1, Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: 14). The operational definition requires that 
campaigns should entail maximalist goals and coordinated, continuous events with at least 
1,000 observed participants, within one week of one another. 
8 We use various secondary sources to establish more precise start and end dates for campaigns. 
We assign January/December as start/end months if we cannot identify more precise dates. 
There are only four such cases, which when removed from the analysis provide identical results 
to those discussed in Table 2. 
9 A national or regional government must be coded as a target in the rioting or political 
parties/leaders and state-owned enterprises clearly aligned to the government. We use two 
SCAD dummy variables that code whether each event targeted the central and/or regional/local 
government (Salehyan and Hendrix 2012: 4). For fringe rioting, we use the SCAD event type 
category which includes violent riot events (p. 2) and for escalatory rioting, use SCAD’s 
escalatory category, coding all protest events that specifically escalated into a riot (p. 3). 
10 The procedure also uses other details in SCAD about event locations. For example, if riots 
events are reported to take place in “mining areas”, then they are assigned to major mining 
locations. 
11 The CNTS data define anti-government demonstrations as “any peaceful public gathering of 
at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to 





General strikes are defined as “any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that 
involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or 
authority”. 
12 We find no evidence for a significant interaction between rioting and protest in the prior year 
on the onset of nonviolent campaigns.  
13 Rioting that escalates from initial nonviolent protest may suggest an ‘act of desperation’, 
whereby rioting occurs in anticipation of the collapse of a nonviolent campaign. Yet, like all 
forms of rioting, this can occur as different stages of a nonviolent campaign, and further 
indicates the demobilizing effect escalatory rioting can have on ongoing nonviolent action. 
Moreover, the lack of clear differing effects of various types of rioting shows that riots, whether 
occurring alongside a campaign or escalating from nonviolent protests, have a general 














Table 3. Interactions (Riot X Repression) and the onset and duration of nonviolent campaigns 











      
Riot Events (Banks) t-1 0.148**     
 (0.056)     
Protest Events (Banks) t-1 -0.091*     
 (0.045)     
All Riots (SCAD) (t-1)  0.154***    
  (0.025)    
Govt. Targeted Riots (t-1)   0.193***   
   (0.029)   
Fringe Riots Only(t-1)    0.212***  
    (0.033)  
Escalatory Riots Only (t-1)     0.283*** 
     (0.051) 
Riot (Banks) X Repression -0.011     
 (0.071)     
Riot (SCAD) X Repression  -0.088 -0.165 -0.166+ -0.198 
  (0.088) (0.102) (0.100) (0.166) 
National Population (log) 0.315*** -0.687* -0.644+ -0.606+ -0.636* 
 (0.061) (0.335) (0.336) (0.311) (0.322) 
Urban Population (%) 0.027** -0.023 -0.021 -0.020 -0.025 
 (0.008) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) 
GDP per Capita (log) -0.552*** 0.508 0.433 0.451 0.472 
 (0.152) (0.547) (0.516) (0.536) (0.474) 
Polity2 0.002 0.079+ 0.084+ 0.085+ 0.069+ 
 (0.019) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.042) 
Election Year 0.569** 0.354 0.302 0.294 0.366 
 (0.177) (0.354) (0.344) (0.349) (0.347) 
V-Dem Physical Integrity  -0.952+     
Index (0.493)     
Ratio of Nonlethal Repression  0.462 0.393 0.479 0.495 
– SCAD (t-1)  (0.700) (0.685) (0.641) (0.673) 
Ratio of Lethal Repression  2.142** 2.222** 2.047** 2.489*** 
– SCAD (t-1)  (0.754) (0.688) (0.765) (0.567) 
Years since last NVC -0.187*     
 (0.073)     
Constant -5.104***     
 (1.360)     
Observations 5825 964 964 964 964 
NVC Terminations - 36 36 36 36 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001                           
Temporal splines in model 9 are not reported in order to condense the table. 
 
